Droit de suite, or the legal right for artists to have a share in
the profits made from the resale of their work, exists in the majority
of the countries of the European Community; it is not part of the law
in the UK. Should it be enacted and, if so, could it be?
The
reasoning behind droit de suite legislation is that artistic works are
often resold at a far higher price than those originally paid to the
artist - which is unfair. This situation is poignantly, if somewhat
misleadingly, illustrated by the great Romantic tales of artists such
as Rembrandt or Van Gogh who lived in apparent poverty during periods
of their lifetime and whose works are now being sold and resold at
incredible prices. However, for those artists and their heirs who have
not become the objects of Romantic fascination the situation is a real
cause of concern.
The increase in the market price is often due to the long-term
enhancement of the artist's reputation in the market place; this itself
derives in part from the skill and labour of the artist during many
years of professional practice. However, artists rarely benefit from
increases in the market value of their works, partly because they often
produce less work in later years or sell less - or they are dead.
Resale royalty legislation changes this situation by giving artists and
their heirs a right to a small percentage of the resale price of an
artistic work.
Arguments against the introduction of droit de suite legislation are
not insubstantial. One is rooted in a belief that the introduction of
such a right is an unwarranted interference with the laws of property
and hence with the legitimate operation of the marketplace. However,
the law has long recognised that for the market to exist at all the
producers need to be guaranteed a fair return for their work. This has
been done in the UK through copyright legislation, which exists to
protect authors against economic abuse of their original skill and
labour, and to enable them to derive income on a 'just deserts' basis
from any merchandising of their images through reproduction or
broadcasting. In contradistinction, moral rights legislation protects
authors against derogatory treatment of their works which affects their
reputation and integrity.
Moral rights and copyright legislation constitute the basis of what
is called intellectual property, and has been introduced throughout the
developed world to make acceptable inroads into what otherwise remain
the all-powerful rights to use one's own property as one wishes. By
recognising the special nature of intellectual property in an image as
opposed, say, to a cabbage, the law has sought to establish rules
whereby artists of all disciplines are better able to make a living;
the more so as the technological revolution of the Twentieth Century
has made merchandising easier and the quality of the products higher.
However in the visual arts the problem is more complex; unlike
musicians and literary authors, most contemporary artists do not earn a
living by exploiting their intellectual property rights in the form of
collecting copyrights, or by specifically making original works for the
specific purposes of merchandising them. They earn their living mostly
by the sale of the original, leaving any marketing to others who may
seek to carve out another market place. Therefore copyright, although
it guarantees them income from reproductions of their works, does not
guarantee them any income from the market activity which actually
generates most money - the sale and resale of their work for profit.
The law has therefore recognised the peculiar nature of intellectual
property through copyright and has added to this the moral right of
artists to protect their reputations, but has not in the UK added the
important resale royalty right.
A further argument suggests that droit de suite legislation would
distort the art marketplace by driving it to countries where salesroom
prices would be less because the resale royalty is not taken by law
from the resale profit. Given the international nature of the salesroom
business, this objection is at best jejune, and weighed against the
benefits that a small resale royalty might bring to contemporary makers
and their heirs it looks a little mendacious.
A third argument against droit de suite legislation is that it would
be complex and difficult to administer. There is no intellectual
property right which is simple and easy to administer. All reproduction
rights have taken many years of hard work by authors' collection
societies to become accepted and established. The same would be true of
droit de suite. At first it would probably be collected easily only
from major salerooms, but even that alone could generate much-needed
income for artists. A well organised artists' collecting society could
put to use the experience gained in the collection of copyrights to
ensure that droit de suite became established throughout the
marketplace in the shortest possible time, as has happened in France
and Germany, for example.
With the increasing harmonisation of the laws in the countries of
the EEC (1992 and all that), the UK Government has little time for
prevarication before it is forced to legislate. Moreover, the UK is
already a signatory to the Berne Convention on intellectual property,
one clause of which states:
"The author, or after his death the persons or institutions
authorised by national legislation, shall with respect to original
works of art enjoy the inalienable right to an interest in any sale of
the work subsequent to the first transfer by the author of the work".
Although there is some argument about whether the UK's obligations
under the convention require the Government to pass legislation to give
effect to that clause (as against our Government simply supporting the
idea in principle), pressure from the EEC and its Council of Ministers
will (as with moral rights enacted here in 1988) eventually succeed.
It is time UK artists had this right. The Whitford Committee which
reported on UK intellectual property law in 1977, although arguing
against the introduction of droit de suite legislation, recommended
that if it were introduced:
- it should be given to artists, who
should be left to administer it themselves; but the right should not be
inalienable (i.e. artists should be able to transfer or sell the right,
as with copyright);
- it should, in accordance with the Berne Convention, last for the artist's lifetime plus fifty years (as with copyright);
- apply only to public sales (i.e. public auctions);
- and that all artistic works should be included in the resale royalty
scheme, which should only operate if a profit in excess of inflation
was made.
In our view the arguments against droit de suite simply do not
outweigh those for its introduction. It is not, as some would have it,
a bizarre and unusual right, derived from an over-zealous
post-Napoleonic republican notion of citizen's rights and wholly
inapplicable in a parliamentary, common law democracy. It is a simple
and effective mechanism for ensuring that contemporary artists can earn
a decent living from their work during their lives. It would be no more
difficult to collect than any other intellectual property right - and,
in the light of over 100 years of collecting the income from such
rights, it should be much easier. Nor will it depress the art
marketplace, since the money which is taken at resale has not proved a
disincentive: on the contrary the money that goes to the artists acts
as an important incentive for them.
Artists do not get a fair return for their work compared to the
returns their works may make for other people. There is a simple and
elegant solution to this inequality - droit de suite. Why not?
© Henry Lydiate & James Odling-Smee 1991